n2n/src/header_encryption.c
Hamish Coleman 80b33cd1a9
Basic C Code lint checker and shell checker (#859)
* Factor build packages out into a more maintainable list

* Create a location for scripts to live

* Provide a make target to return the source dir as close as reasonable to the original distributed state

* Add a code lint step, checking the coding style

* Change test harness as recommended by shellcheck

* Ensure we actually have the linter tool installed

* Use the correct directory for cmake to run the tests

* Adjust for the older uncrustify in the current github ubuntu-latest

* Make one file pass the linter

* Integrate the lint with the existing test workflow

* Add files with minimal changes needed to the linter

* Add more files with minimal changes needed to the linter

* Dont build binaries if we fail the lint test

* Update the phony targets with the lint steps

* Ensure the flake8 package is installed in the new lint workflow job

* Use the makefile to drive the packages needed to install for linting

* No need to add dependancies on lint, just rely on the workflow status to show failure

* Update the scripts dir README to reflect current assumptions

* Rename and briefly document the indent.sh script

* Fix the ignore to ignore the right Makefile

* Rename the test_harness script to make it clear it is a shell script

* Provide a master lint make target and add a shell script lint tool

* Elminate stray tabs

* Drop include/auth.h from linter - there are inconsistant results with function definitions when using the current uncrustify rules
2021-10-24 01:21:18 +05:45

171 lines
5.8 KiB
C

/**
* (C) 2007-21 - ntop.org and contributors
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not see see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
*
*/
#include "n2n.h"
#define HASH_FIND_COMMUNITY(head, name, out) HASH_FIND_STR(head, name, out)
int packet_header_decrypt (uint8_t packet[], uint16_t packet_len,
char *community_name,
he_context_t *ctx, he_context_t *ctx_iv,
uint64_t *stamp) {
// try community name as possible key and check for magic bytes "n2__"
uint32_t magic = 0x6E320000;
uint32_t test_magic;
uint32_t checksum_high = 0;
// check for magic
// so, as a first step, decrypt last 4 bytes from where originally the community name would be
speck_ctr((uint8_t*)&test_magic, &packet[16], 4, packet, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
test_magic = be32toh(test_magic);
//extract header length (lower 2 bytes)
uint32_t header_len = test_magic - magic;
if(header_len <= packet_len) {
// decrypt the complete header
speck_ctr(&packet[16], &packet[16], header_len - 16, packet, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
// extract time stamp and un-xor actual checksum (calculated here) from it
// if payload was altered (different checksum than original), time stamp verification will fail
// use speck block cipher step (1 block == 128 bit == 16 bytes)
speck_128_decrypt(packet, (speck_context_t*)ctx_iv);
// extract the required data
*stamp = be64toh(*(uint64_t*)&packet[4]);
checksum_high = be32toh(*(uint32_t*)packet);
// restore original packet order before calculating checksum
memcpy(&packet[0], &packet[20], 4);
memcpy(&packet[4], community_name, N2N_COMMUNITY_SIZE);
uint64_t checksum = pearson_hash_64(packet, packet_len);
if((checksum >> 32) != checksum_high) {
traceEvent(TRACE_DEBUG, "packet_header_decrypt dropped a packet with invalid checksum.");
// unsuccessful
return 0;
}
*stamp = *stamp ^ (checksum << 32);
// successful
return 1;
} else {
// unsuccessful
return 0;
}
}
int packet_header_encrypt (uint8_t packet[], uint16_t header_len, uint16_t packet_len,
he_context_t *ctx, he_context_t *ctx_iv,
uint64_t stamp) {
uint32_t *p32 = (uint32_t*)packet;
uint64_t *p64 = (uint64_t*)packet;
uint64_t checksum = 0;
uint32_t magic = 0x6E320000; /* == ASCII "n2__" */
magic += header_len;
if(packet_len < 24) {
traceEvent(TRACE_DEBUG, "packet_header_encrypt dropped a packet too short to be valid.");
return -1;
}
// we trust in the caller assuring header_len <= packet_len
checksum = pearson_hash_64(packet, packet_len);
// re-order packet
p32[5] = p32[0];
// add time stamp, checksum, and random to form the pre-IV
p64[0] = htobe64(checksum);
p32[1] = p32[1] ^ htobe32((uint32_t)(stamp >> 32));
p32[2] = htobe32((uint32_t)stamp);
p32[3] = n2n_rand();
// encrypt this pre-IV to IV
speck_128_encrypt(packet, (speck_context_t*)ctx_iv);
// place IV plus magic in packet
p32[4] = htobe32(magic);
// encrypt, starting from magic
speck_ctr(&packet[16], &packet[16], header_len - 16, packet, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
return 0;
}
void packet_header_setup_key (const char *community_name,
he_context_t **ctx_static, he_context_t **ctx_dynamic,
he_context_t **ctx_iv_static, he_context_t **ctx_iv_dynamic) {
uint8_t key[16];
// for REGISTER_SUPER, REGISTER_SUPER_ACK, REGISTER_SUPER_NAK only;
// for all other packets, same as static by default (changed by user/pw auth scheme
// calling packet_header_change_dynamic_key later)
pearson_hash_128(key, (uint8_t*)community_name, N2N_COMMUNITY_SIZE);
if(!*ctx_static)
*ctx_static = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(speck_context_t));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_static, key, 128);
if(!*ctx_dynamic)
*ctx_dynamic = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(speck_context_t));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_dynamic, key, 128);
// hash again and use as key for IV encryption
pearson_hash_128(key, key, sizeof(key));
if(!*ctx_iv_static)
*ctx_iv_static = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(speck_context_t));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_iv_static, key, 128);
if(!*ctx_iv_dynamic)
*ctx_iv_dynamic = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(speck_context_t));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_iv_dynamic, key, 128);
}
void packet_header_change_dynamic_key (uint8_t *key_dynamic,
he_context_t **ctx_dynamic, he_context_t **ctx_iv_dynamic) {
uint8_t key[16];
pearson_hash_128(key, key_dynamic, N2N_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
// for REGISTER_SUPER, REGISTER_SUPER_ACK, REGISTER_SUPER_NAK only
// for all other packets, same as static by default (changed by user/pw auth scheme)
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_dynamic, key, 128);
// hash again and use as key for IV encryption
// REMOVE as soon as checksum and replay protection get their own fields
pearson_hash_128(key, key, sizeof(key));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx_iv_dynamic, key, 128);
}