n2n/src/header_encryption.c

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/**
* (C) 2007-21 - ntop.org and contributors
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*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not see see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>
*
*/
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#include "n2n.h"
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#define HASH_FIND_COMMUNITY(head, name, out) HASH_FIND_STR(head, name, out)
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int packet_header_decrypt (uint8_t packet[], uint16_t packet_len,
char *community_name,
he_context_t *ctx, he_context_t *ctx_iv,
uint64_t *stamp) {
// assemble IV
// the last four are ASCII "n2n!" and do not get overwritten
uint8_t iv[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x32, 0x6E, 0x21 };
// the first 96 bits of the packet get padded with ASCII "n2n!" to full 128 bit IV
memcpy(iv, packet, 12);
// try community name as possible key and check for magic bytes "n2__"
uint32_t magic = 0x6E320000;
uint32_t test_magic;
// check for magic
// so, as a first step, decrypt 4 bytes only starting at byte 12
speck_ctr((uint8_t*)&test_magic, &packet[12], 4, iv, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
test_magic = be32toh(test_magic);
//extract header length (lower 2 bytes)
uint32_t header_len = test_magic - magic;
if (header_len <= packet_len) {
// decrypt the complete header
speck_ctr(&packet[12], &packet[12], header_len - 12, iv, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
// restore original packet order
memcpy(&packet[0], &packet[16], 4);
memcpy(&packet[4], community_name, N2N_COMMUNITY_SIZE);
// extract time stamp (first 64 bit) and un-xor actual checksum (calculated here) from it
// if payload was altered (different checksum than original), time stamp verification will fail
speck_96_decrypt(iv, (speck_context_t*)ctx_iv);
uint64_t checksum = pearson_hash_64(packet, packet_len);
*stamp = be64toh(*(uint64_t*)iv) ^ checksum;
// successful
return 1;
} else {
// unsuccessful
return 0;
}
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}
int packet_header_encrypt (uint8_t packet[], uint16_t header_len, uint16_t packet_len,
he_context_t *ctx, he_context_t *ctx_iv,
uint64_t stamp) {
uint8_t iv[16];
uint32_t *iv32 = (uint32_t*)&iv;
uint64_t *iv64 = (uint64_t*)&iv;
uint64_t checksum = 0;
uint32_t magic = 0x6E320000; /* == ASCII "n2__" */
magic += header_len;
if(packet_len < 20) {
traceEvent(TRACE_DEBUG, "packet_header_encrypt dropped a packet too short to be valid.");
return -1;
}
// we trust in the caller assuring header_len <= packet_len
checksum = pearson_hash_64(packet, packet_len);
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// re-order packet
memcpy(&packet[16], &packet[00], 4);
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// add time stamp, checksum and magic bytes to form the pre-IV
iv64[0] = htobe64(stamp ^ checksum);
iv32[2] = n2n_rand();
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// encrypt this 96-bit pre-IV to IV
speck_96_encrypt(iv, (speck_context_t*)ctx_iv);
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// place IV in packet (including magic number)
iv32[3] = htobe32(magic);
memcpy(packet, iv, 16);
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// replace magic number "n2__" by correct IV padding "n2n!"
iv32[3] = htobe32(0x6E326E21);
// encrypt
speck_ctr(&packet[12], &packet[12], header_len - 12, iv, (speck_context_t*)ctx);
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return 0;
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}
void packet_header_setup_key (const char *community_name,
he_context_t **ctx, he_context_t **ctx_iv) {
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uint8_t key[16];
pearson_hash_128(key, (uint8_t*)community_name, N2N_COMMUNITY_SIZE);
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*ctx = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof (speck_context_t));
speck_init((speck_context_t**)ctx, key, 128);
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// hash again and use last 96 bit (skipping 4 bytes) as key for IV encryption
// REMOVE as soon as checksum and replay protection get their own fields
pearson_hash_128(key, key, sizeof (key));
*ctx_iv = (he_context_t*)calloc(1, sizeof (speck_context_t));
speck_96_expand_key((speck_context_t*)*ctx_iv, &key[4]);
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}