Restrict the GitHub token permissions only to the required ones; this way, even if the attackers will succeed in compromising your workflow, they won’t be able to do much. - Included permissions for the action. https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-workflows/workflow-syntax-for-github-actions#permissions https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-jobs/assigning-permissions-to-jobs [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/) Signed-off-by: naveen <172697+naveensrinivasan@users.noreply.github.com>
26 lines
776 B
YAML
26 lines
776 B
YAML
name: Automatic Rebase
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on:
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issue_comment:
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types: [created]
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permissions:
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contents: read
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jobs:
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rebase:
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permissions:
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contents: write # for cirrus-actions/rebase to push code to rebase
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pull-requests: read # for cirrus-actions/rebase to get info about PR
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name: Rebase
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if: github.event.issue.pull_request != '' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '/rebase')
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: Checkout the latest code
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uses: actions/checkout@v2
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with:
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token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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fetch-depth: 0 # otherwise, you will fail to push refs to dest repo
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- name: Automatic Rebase
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uses: cirrus-actions/rebase@1.4
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env:
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GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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