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armbian-build/patch/kernel/archive/sun50iw9-btt-6.1/linux-6.1.47-48.patch

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diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
index 2f923c805802f..f79cb11b080f6 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst
@@ -124,8 +124,8 @@ sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
-untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
-function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
+untraining function srso_alias_untrain_ret() and the safe return
+function srso_alias_safe_ret() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 375efcfb91f8f..8bb8dd199c552 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 1
-SUBLEVEL = 47
+SUBLEVEL = 48
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Curry Ramen
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 674ed46d3ceda..11203a9fe0a87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
{
mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
+ amd_clear_divider();
}
#define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 31fa631c8587c..2f123d4fb85b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -168,9 +168,9 @@
.endm
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
-#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET "call zen_untrain_ret"
+#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "call entry_untrain_ret"
#else
-#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET ""
+#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET ""
#endif
/*
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@
* return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
* typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
*
- * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
+ * While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
* entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
*
* As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
@@ -189,14 +189,9 @@
defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
- CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
+ CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
"call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
- ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
- "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
-#endif
.endm
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -210,10 +205,21 @@
typedef u8 retpoline_thunk_t[RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
-extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
+#else
+static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
+#endif
+
+extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
+extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
+extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
+
+extern void retbleed_untrain_ret(void);
extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
-extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
+extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void);
+
+extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
extern void entry_ibpb(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 239b302973d7a..f240c978d85e4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -1295,3 +1295,4 @@ void noinstr amd_clear_divider(void)
asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "div %2\n\t", X86_BUG_DIV0)
:: "a" (0), "d" (0), "r" (1));
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_clear_divider);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d98f33ea57e47..3a893ab398a01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
+void (*x86_return_thunk)(void) __ro_after_init = &__x86_return_thunk;
+
/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
static void update_spec_ctrl(u64 val)
{
@@ -164,8 +166,13 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
- gds_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * srso_select_mitigation() depends and must run after
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation().
+ */
srso_select_mitigation();
+ gds_select_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -1013,6 +1020,9 @@ do_cmd_auto:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK))
+ x86_return_thunk = retbleed_return_thunk;
+
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
@@ -2388,9 +2398,10 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
*/
- if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
- (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)))
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+ return;
+ }
}
if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
@@ -2419,11 +2430,15 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
* like ftrace, static_call, etc.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
- else
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
+ } else {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
+ }
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
@@ -2672,6 +2687,9 @@ static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
+
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
(cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
index a9b54b795ebff..3fbb491688275 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -184,6 +184,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
*/
bool __static_call_fixup(void *tramp, u8 op, void *dest)
{
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)tramp;
+ /*
+ * Not all .return_sites are a static_call trampoline (most are not).
+ * Check if the 3 bytes after the return are still kernel text, if not,
+ * then this definitely is not a trampoline and we need not worry
+ * further.
+ *
+ * This avoids the memcmp() below tripping over pagefaults etc..
+ */
+ if (((addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) != ((addr + 7) >> PAGE_SHIFT)) &&
+ !kernel_text_address(addr + 7))
+ return false;
+
if (memcmp(tramp+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
/* Not a trampoline site, not our problem. */
return false;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 7e8795d8b0f17..c0a5a4f225d9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -206,8 +206,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_divide_error)
{
do_error_trap(regs, 0, "divide error", X86_TRAP_DE, SIGFPE,
FPE_INTDIV, error_get_trap_addr(regs));
-
- amd_clear_divider();
}
DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index e6939ebb606ab..78ccb5ec3c0e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -134,18 +134,18 @@ SECTIONS
KPROBES_TEXT
ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
- *(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain)
+ *(.text..__x86.rethunk_untrain)
#endif
ENTRY_TEXT
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
/*
- * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s
+ * See the comment above srso_alias_untrain_ret()'s
* definition.
*/
- . = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
- *(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe)
+ . = srso_alias_untrain_ret | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
+ *(.text..__x86.rethunk_safe)
#endif
ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
@@ -154,8 +154,8 @@ SECTIONS
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
__indirect_thunk_start = .;
- *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
- *(.text.__x86.return_thunk)
+ *(.text..__x86.indirect_thunk)
+ *(.text..__x86.return_thunk)
__indirect_thunk_end = .;
#endif
} :text =0xcccc
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
"fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area");
#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
-. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned");
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+. = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
#endif
@@ -523,8 +523,8 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
* Instead do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR
* of the two function addresses:
*/
-. = ASSERT(((ABSOLUTE(srso_untrain_ret_alias) | srso_safe_ret_alias) -
- (ABSOLUTE(srso_untrain_ret_alias) & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
+. = ASSERT(((ABSOLUTE(srso_alias_untrain_ret) | srso_alias_safe_ret) -
+ (ABSOLUTE(srso_alias_untrain_ret) & srso_alias_safe_ret)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
"SRSO function pair won't alias");
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index fdb6007f2eb86..a96f9a17e8b5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3947,6 +3947,8 @@ static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_in
guest_state_enter_irqoff();
+ amd_clear_divider();
+
if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
else
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 30e76fab678a5..65c5c44f006bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nops.h>
- .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
+ .section .text..__x86.indirect_thunk
.macro RETPOLINE reg
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
@@ -76,75 +76,106 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
/*
- * srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at
+ * srso_alias_untrain_ret() and srso_alias_safe_ret() are placed at
* special addresses:
*
- * - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned
- * - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
+ * - srso_alias_untrain_ret() is 2M aligned
+ * - srso_alias_safe_ret() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
* and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the
- * srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared).
+ * srso_alias_untrain_ret() function are cleared).
*
* This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch
* target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential
* poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted.
*
- * As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return.
+ * As a result, srso_alias_safe_ret() becomes a safe return.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
- .section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain
+ .section .text..__x86.rethunk_untrain
-SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+SYM_START(srso_alias_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
ASM_NOP2
lfence
- jmp __x86_return_thunk
-SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
-__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
+ jmp srso_alias_return_thunk
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
- .section .text.__x86.rethunk_safe
+ .section .text..__x86.rethunk_safe
+#else
+/* dummy definition for alternatives */
+SYM_START(srso_alias_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
+ int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
#endif
-/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */
-SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
- add $8, %_ASM_SP
+SYM_START(srso_alias_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+ lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
-#endif
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
int3
-SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_safe_ret)
+
+ .section .text..__x86.return_thunk
- .section .text.__x86.return_thunk
+SYM_CODE_START(srso_alias_return_thunk)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ call srso_alias_safe_ret
+ ud2
+SYM_CODE_END(srso_alias_return_thunk)
+
+/*
+ * Some generic notes on the untraining sequences:
+ *
+ * They are interchangeable when it comes to flushing potentially wrong
+ * RET predictions from the BTB.
+ *
+ * The SRSO Zen1/2 (MOVABS) untraining sequence is longer than the
+ * Retbleed sequence because the return sequence done there
+ * (srso_safe_ret()) is longer and the return sequence must fully nest
+ * (end before) the untraining sequence. Therefore, the untraining
+ * sequence must fully overlap the return sequence.
+ *
+ * Regarding alignment - the instructions which need to be untrained,
+ * must all start at a cacheline boundary for Zen1/2 generations. That
+ * is, instruction sequences starting at srso_safe_ret() and
+ * the respective instruction sequences at retbleed_return_thunk()
+ * must start at a cacheline boundary.
+ */
/*
* Safety details here pertain to the AMD Zen{1,2} microarchitecture:
- * 1) The RET at __x86_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for
+ * 1) The RET at retbleed_return_thunk must be on a 64 byte boundary, for
* alignment within the BTB.
- * 2) The instruction at zen_untrain_ret must contain, and not
+ * 2) The instruction at retbleed_untrain_ret must contain, and not
* end with, the 0xc3 byte of the RET.
* 3) STIBP must be enabled, or SMT disabled, to prevent the sibling thread
* from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
*/
.align 64
- .skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
-SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+ .skip 64 - (retbleed_return_thunk - retbleed_untrain_ret), 0xcc
+SYM_START(retbleed_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
/*
- * As executed from zen_untrain_ret, this is:
+ * As executed from retbleed_untrain_ret, this is:
*
* TEST $0xcc, %bl
* LFENCE
- * JMP __x86_return_thunk
+ * JMP retbleed_return_thunk
*
* Executing the TEST instruction has a side effect of evicting any BTB
* prediction (potentially attacker controlled) attached to the RET, as
- * __x86_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment.
+ * retbleed_return_thunk + 1 isn't an instruction boundary at the moment.
*/
.byte 0xf6
/*
- * As executed from __x86_return_thunk, this is a plain RET.
+ * As executed from retbleed_return_thunk, this is a plain RET.
*
* As part of the TEST above, RET is the ModRM byte, and INT3 the imm8.
*
@@ -156,13 +187,13 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
* With SMT enabled and STIBP active, a sibling thread cannot poison
* RET's prediction to a type of its choice, but can evict the
* prediction due to competitive sharing. If the prediction is
- * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
+ * evicted, retbleed_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
* which will be contained safely by the INT3.
*/
-SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(retbleed_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ret
int3
-SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
+SYM_CODE_END(retbleed_return_thunk)
/*
* Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
@@ -173,16 +204,16 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
* Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
* INT3 is for SLS protection.
*/
- jmp __ret
+ jmp retbleed_return_thunk
int3
-SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
-__EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
+SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(retbleed_untrain_ret)
/*
- * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret()
+ * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to retbleed_untrain_ret()
* above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a
*
- * movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax
+ * movabs $0xccccc30824648d48,%rax
*
* and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret()
* later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and
@@ -194,22 +225,44 @@ SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
.byte 0x48, 0xb8
+/*
+ * This forces the function return instruction to speculate into a trap
+ * (UD2 in srso_return_thunk() below). This RET will then mispredict
+ * and execution will continue at the return site read from the top of
+ * the stack.
+ */
SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
- add $8, %_ASM_SP
+ lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
ret
int3
int3
- int3
+ /* end of movabs */
lfence
call srso_safe_ret
- int3
+ ud2
SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret)
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret)
-SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk)
- ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
- "call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+SYM_CODE_START(srso_return_thunk)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ call srso_safe_ret
+ ud2
+SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret", \
+ "jmp srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
+ "jmp srso_alias_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
+
+SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
+ UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+ ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+ ret
int3
SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
index a60c5efe34b36..29c35279c7ed8 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/arch/x86/decode.c
@@ -799,5 +799,5 @@ bool arch_is_rethunk(struct symbol *sym)
return !strcmp(sym->name, "__x86_return_thunk") ||
!strcmp(sym->name, "srso_untrain_ret") ||
!strcmp(sym->name, "srso_safe_ret") ||
- !strcmp(sym->name, "__ret");
+ !strcmp(sym->name, "retbleed_return_thunk");
}
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index c2c350933a237..913bd361c3684 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static int decode_instructions(struct objtool_file *file)
if (!strcmp(sec->name, ".noinstr.text") ||
!strcmp(sec->name, ".entry.text") ||
- !strncmp(sec->name, ".text.__x86.", 12))
+ !strncmp(sec->name, ".text..__x86.", 13))
sec->noinstr = true;
for (offset = 0; offset < sec->sh.sh_size; offset += insn->len) {
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file)
struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off);
/*
- * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret().
+ * This is a special case for retbleed_untrain_ret().
* It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool
* can't find the thunk's starting RET
* instruction, because the RET is also in the
@@ -2450,12 +2450,17 @@ static int decode_sections(struct objtool_file *file)
return 0;
}
-static bool is_fentry_call(struct instruction *insn)
+static bool is_special_call(struct instruction *insn)
{
- if (insn->type == INSN_CALL &&
- insn->call_dest &&
- insn->call_dest->fentry)
- return true;
+ if (insn->type == INSN_CALL) {
+ struct symbol *dest = insn->call_dest;
+
+ if (!dest)
+ return false;
+
+ if (dest->fentry)
+ return true;
+ }
return false;
}
@@ -3448,7 +3453,7 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
if (ret)
return ret;
- if (opts.stackval && func && !is_fentry_call(insn) &&
+ if (opts.stackval && func && !is_special_call(insn) &&
!has_valid_stack_frame(&state)) {
WARN_FUNC("call without frame pointer save/setup",
sec, insn->offset);
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